Levon Ter-Petrossian's Speech at the September 18, 2009 Public Rally. Part 2

Nagorno Karabakh

While, as mentioned above, everything is crystal clear in the field of Armenian-Turkish relations, the situation is much more complex in the process of the Karabakh conflict resolution. There are claims spread around that a so called frame agreement was signed at the meeting of Medvedev-Sargsyan-Aliyev on 07.17-18.2009. I don't know whether these claims have any grounds or not, but it is probable that some preliminary protocol has already been signed. Yet this is not what is important. It is not so much the question of whether anything is already signed or not, the real problem is that the Karabakh settlement process has reached a point from which there is no return or retreat for Serge Sargsyan.

What gives me grounds to come to such a categorical conclusion? First and foremost, it is the unprecedented July 10 statement of presidents Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy, which is nothing other than a declaration of their personal involvement in the Karabakh conflict settlement process, and which significantly elevates the level of the mediation mission of their countries. Such a thing usually happens in the finishing phase of a settlement, which means that the Karabakh issue resolution is around the corner.

Equally notable is the very content of this statement, which discloses the 6 basic principles of the settlement:

- Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control

- An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance

-A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh

- Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will

- The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence

- International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

Since the statement was made on the presidential level, one has to assume that these principles are non-negotiable and they could not be subject to any change. Who would let Aliyev and Sargsyan argue with Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy as they were able to do with Bryza, Merzlyakov and Fassiet? There is no sense to argue because the presidents of the three superpowers have already made their final decision and declared about it. Judging from the official reactions, Azerbaijan seems to have nothing to argue about, because it accepted the aforementioned settlement program with unconcealed joy, simultaneously revealing certain other details of the plan, the most important of which is the immediate return of five districts to Azerbaijan, while Kelbajar and Lachin are set to be returned in 5-6 years.

As for Armenia's response, the official propaganda machine refrains from revealing the details and would time and again, although half-heartedly, repeat a parrot-like drill that the settlement plan fully meets the three main demands of the Armenian side, as it provides for international security guarantees for Karabakh, secures a corridor linking Armenia and Karabakh and reiterates Karabakh's right to self-determination. Let us see whether the principles contained in the statement of the three presidents do really meet these demands, as claimed by the Armenian authorities. But before doing that, it must be noted that the statement is written in Aesopian language, teeming with metaphors and euphemisms with a purpose to make it easier for each of the representatives of the parties to the conflict to interpret the principles to their advantage and present them to the public at large in their countries. It is often that diplomacy resorts to such psychological tricks.

As mentioned above, according to one of the claims made by the Armenian authorities, the settlement plan on the table provides for international security guarantees for Karabakh, which undoubtedly means that after the territories have been returned, multinational peace- keeping will be deployed all along the border of what in the past used to be called the Nagorno Karabakh autonomous region. It seems that this is confirmed by the statement of the presidents of the superpowers, because point 6 of this statement reads as follows: "International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation". However, a question arises why would the settlement principle that yet in the early 90s in the context of the Karabakh conflict resolution process sounded like "deployment of peace-keeping forces" have suddenly metamorphosed into the vague notion of "International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation"?
Is this an accidental oversight or a detail? I do not think so. In all likelihood the following has happened. Encountering complications and failing to come to an agreement regarding the national composition and the numbers of the peacekeeping forces, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group have decided to circumvent that issue and for the time being to find a formulation, which will conceal the essence of the problem, and which can become in the future the basis of varying interpretations. I do not rule out that the so-called "peacekeeping operation" will in the end amount not to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, but rather to the stationing of one or two thousand observers, which is difficult to call a guarantee of Karabakh's security even if we really wanted to. That this can end up being the result is corroborated not only by the arguments put forward above, but indirectly by the transparent hints of the Minsk Group co-chairmen as well.

Equally suspect and shaky is the claim about the "creation of a land corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh." Even though the idea of the "creation of a land corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh" is fixed in the joint statement of Obama, Medvedev, and Sarkozy, it is not clear what this corridor is. In particular, there is no clarity about the following questions: when will the status of the corridor be determined? What width will the corridor have? And finally, who is going to control the territory of the corridor? In exchange for the return of the five districts, the Armenian side should have received comprehensive answers at least to those questions. Better yet, the status of the corridor should have been determined in the current phase of the process, instead of being left to the future. In the past the Minsk Group co-chairmen had put forward three options for solving the problem of the Lachin corridor: exchange the corridor's territory with the territories of Mardakert and Martuni, which were occupied by Azerbaijan, and which covered an area of 400 square kilometers; to lease the territory of the corridor to Armenia for 99 years; to put the territory of the corridor under international control for the same period. Whether or not those proposals were acceptable is not the point. The point is that the problem of defining the corridor's status was on the agenda already during the phase preceding the return of the territories. Now, by contrast, there is total uncertainty regarding that question, which causes concern that after the return of the territories the idea of a corridor will at some point be reduced to the idea of ensuring free transit between Armenia and Karabakh. Another thing that is a source of concern is that using the notorious precedent set by Robert Kocharyan's offer to trade Lachin with Meghri, Azerbaijan may one day reintroduce the demand for an equivalent corridor or a transit route to Nakhijevan, if the problem of the corridor is not linked to the return of the territories.

A more comprehensive explanation is required for the third claim of the Armenian authorities, according to which the plan under discussion entails the "realization of the right to self-determination for Karabakh," or, if we rely on another formulation of the official propaganda, "Karabakh is recognized as a subject of the right to self-determination." Undoubtedly, the following points in the 10 July statement form the basis of this claim: a) "The Basic Principles reflect a reasonable compromise based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, and the Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples;" b) "Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will." Because the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination are in inherent contradiction, the meaning of the first point is purely psychological, therefore, trying to draw conclusions from it is pointless. The only reason that point has been included in the document at this stage is to give the leaderships of Armenia and Azerbaijan an opportunity to convince their societies that the problem of the status of Karabakh is going to be solved on the basis of their favored principle.

At first glance the second point, which the Armenian leadership is presenting as a decision to determine the status of Karabakh through a referendum, seems to be more substantive. But if that is the case, it is difficult to understand why instead of using the word referendum, if indeed we are dealing with a referendum, the phrase "expression of will" has been used. If referendum is in fact what will be conducted, they should have at least used the phrase "expression of the people's will." It is, therefore, obvious that everything has been done to avoid using the word "referendum. " Why?

I want to remind that the idea of a referendum has been put into circulation as part of the so-called Prague process and then included in the Madrid proposals. Afterwards, having met Azerbaijan's resistance, the co-chairmen had to replace it with the word "plebiscite" and then the phrase "popular vote." When that failed to satisfy the Azerbaijanis too, they came up with the vague phrase "expression of will," which allows each of the sides to interpret and present it to their peoples as they see fit. "Expression of will" can indeed mean a referendum, but depending on ones preferences, the signature of the president of Karabakh or a decision by the National Assembly can also be considered "expression of will." Judging from the way events are unfolding, we have to recognize that the things are going to end up moving in that direction.

Nevertheless, even that is not what is essential. Even if the word "referendum" was clearly stated among the principles of resolution, that would still mean nothing, because it would remain an empty sound without the clarification of certain conditions. These conditions, which I have presented in one of my previous speeches, are the following: who is going to organize the referendum, the UN, the CSCE, Azerbaijan, or Karabakh? When is the referendum going to be held? On what territory is it going to be held? Who is going to participate in it? What is going to be the formulation of the question of the referendum? What are going to be the legal consequences of the referendum? As unpleasant as it is, one cannot fail to notice that the renewed Madrid principles have neither answered these questions, nor used the word "referendum."

Thus none of three major claims of Armenia's official propaganda correspond to the reality: the current program of the resolution does neither contain international guarantees for Karabakh's security, nor does it ensure an overland corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, or envisage an avenue for the realization of Karabakh's right to self-determination. The absence of these essential elements means that the Madrid proposal, which was initially devised as a package deal, has become a purely step by step plan. In other words, after years of searching and wandering, the Armenian authorities have returned to the plan, which 10 years ago they had declared defeatist and rejected - something that they will not have the courage to acknowledge, of course.
A question arises as to why we had to suffer all those losses - decline in Armenia's and Karabakh's population, shift in the distribution of power in Azerbaijan's favor, weakening of Armenia's positions in the international arena, etc. - if we had to return to the step by step plan. But that is only one side of the question. The other, and more painful aspect of the question, is that the step by step plan of 1997 was far more preferable for the Armenian side than today's version, if only because that version unambiguously guaranteed the stationing of international peacekeepers and it contained not a word about the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Karabakh proper.

Why has the process of settling the Karabakh conflict reached today's depressing state? The first reason undoubtedly is the exclusion of Karabakh from the process as party to the conflict. Many politicians and pro-government political analysts underestimate the significance of this fact, and some distort the essence of the problem by presenting it as simply the Karabakh's participation or non-participation in the negotiations. But the essence of the reality of being party to the conflict is not just that formal circumstance, but rather the fact that up until 1998 the Minsk Group co-chairmen had to present their written proposals not just to Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also to Karabakh, which means the latter's agreement was required for the implementation of any plan of settlement. In other words, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh were equals in the negotiating process, endowed with veto power. It is forgivable when people, who have not dealt with the process of settling the Karabakh conflict don't understand this simple truth, but when Vartan Oskanian does not understand this or pretends not to understand, it is strange, if not immoral.
The last formal proposal that was presented to Karabakh was the so-called "common state" proposal. The Key West and Madrid plans, which were worked out after that, have been presented only to Armenia and Azerbaijan. In other words, starting from 1999 Karabakh has de facto ceased to be party to the negotiations, although de jure it retains that status, which was acquired at the Budapest summit. The whole tragedy is that the decision of the Budapest summit, which must be considered the greatest achievement of Armenian diplomacy, has been destroyed not by Azerbaijan or the co-chairmen, but by the Armenian side, particularly due to the efforts of Robert Kocharyan, Vartan Oskanian, and Arkadi Ghukasyan. They have committed a fateful error, which has no sane explanation of justification, and which is going to cost Armenia and Karabakh dearly.

As paradoxical as it may sound, the other reason for the impeding unfavorable resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the relentless plunder of Armenia's national wealth, which not only Armenia's cleptocratic regime, but also the entire criminal-oligarchic economic elite are implicated in. I have had other occasions to state on the basis of specific facts that in the last ten years the high-ranking officials and big businessmen enjoying their support have plundered more than half of the national wealth - a sum of several billion dollars, which our patriotic "select few" have either wasted on conspicuous consumption or exported to other countries. You may wonder how this is related to the Karabakh problem. The connection is direct and obvious. I have revealed it in my speech of 26 October, 2007, where I pointed out the following simple truth: "If that sum was invested in Artsakh, the latter would have been independent already." What I said about independence is probably an exaggeration, but that Artsakh would have a larger population, would be more prosperous in that case, and therefore would have more influence on the processes, is beyond doubt.

And the third reason, which no one even needs to be reminded of, is the reality of Serge Sargsyan's lack of legitimacy, which is forcing him to make unnecessary concessions both in the Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh negotiations in order to gain the favor of the international community and at least some legitimacy. No matter how hard one tries, it is difficult to find another explanation for his strange behavior. In the absence of his legitimacy problem, nothing would have forced him to declare that in exchange for opening the border he is willing to agree to the creation of a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians, or to adopt a policy of extreme concessions in Karabakh. An impression is created that for the sake of giving some legitimacy to his usurped power he has become hostage to such unbreakable agreements, which he cannot back away from. In fact, these agreements have probably been reached before the presidential elections. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the obviously tolerant attitude of the international community toward the falsified elections, the crime of 1 March and the violence unleashed against the opposition and the people.

With the exception of a few forces that are part of it, the Armenian National Congress has always stated that it favors a resolution of the Karabakh conflict through compromises, having the balanced nature of those compromises as its chief principle. The analysis of the evidence presented above shows that it is precisely that principle that has been violated: Azerbaijan is getting much more than Karabakh and Armenia. To put it differently, Serge Sargsyan is going ahead with a solution that is not favorable for the Armenian side, to put it mildly, or at worst it endangers Karabakh's existence. Is it possible to reverse the current course of developments, or at least affect it somehow? These are the questions the final sections of my speech are dedicated to.
The way out of the situation

The way the situation evolved would have been different, of course, had the leadership of Karabakh reacted to the alarm sounded by the Armenian National Congress, reclaimed its status as a party to the conflict granted during the Budapest summit and forbidden the Armenian authorities to speak on its behalf. That was not done, and instead, in order to get out of an awkward situation, the Karabakh leadership confined itself to statements regarding the necessity of its participation in the negotiations, which were seemingly principled, but were empty in reality. The officials of Karabakh love to repeat every chance they get that they have faith in Serge Sargsyan, that they are convinced that he will not sign the document, or as they put it, he will not give Karabakh up. Faith, of course, is a respectable feeling, but not a political category. After all, Serge Sargsyan in his turn had faith in the Turks, but it did not prevent them from disappointing him. Therefore, I am sorry to say, it is hard to believe that Karabakh leaders indeed believe Serge Sargsyan.

Reason tells us that other motives underlie the positions of Karabakh leaders. Serge Sargsyan could not have failed to present the resolution plan to them in all of its detail. Therefore, if even after having been informed, the Karabakh leaders are not doing anything tangible to prevent the undesirable resolution of their own conflict, then it means they do not object to that resolution. And if they are not standing to oppose Sargsyan's policy, that means something even worse: they care more about keeping the Karabakh clan in power in Armenia than about the fate of Karabakh.

The unfavorable process of resolving the Karabakh conflict could be more easily reversed if Serge Sargsyan resigned, if the constitutional order was restored in the country, and if a legitimate government was formed. Even if change of power did not produce a radical revision of the logic of the current resolution plan, it would at the very least create prerequisites for considerably improving that plan. A legitimate government would not have to make unnecessary concessions and to retreat from the what used to be the strong positions of the Armenians side, no matter how badly they have been damaged as a result of Robert Kocharyan's and Serge Sargsyan's incompetent and irresponsible policies. The change of power, therefore, is the only means of seriously affecting the current trend of the Karabakh negotiations and preventing their dangerous consequences.

Change of power can happen in two ways. The first and gentle way is for Serge Sargsyan to resign voluntarily. There are rumors among people close to the authorities in both Armenia and Karabakh that regardless of his conduct, Serge Sargsyan will not sign any deal, and if he has to sign after all, he will resign. There are those insisting that in private conversations he himself has spoken about his intention to resign if he comes under pressure to sign an unacceptable plan of settlement. I think, nevertheless, that these rumors are baseless and they are being spread only to temporarily sooth the concerns of people, who are worried about the fate of Karabakh. Serge Sargsyan has become so entangled in the web of commitments he has made to the international community in exchange for having his legitimacy recognized that he cannot refuse to sign the final agreement even if he really wants. The international community has multiple levers not to permit Serge Sargsyan to do such a thing, starting with the raising the question of his illegitimacy and the presence of political prisoners in the country, and ending with compromising material on him.

The other path is the forced resignation of Serge Sargsyan, which can happen only if a powerful and continuous wave of national protest rises up. As I have laid it out in detail in my 21 December, 2008 speech, the Armenian National Congress does not have the power to solve that problem alone. Time constraints and circumstances do not permit to repeat all the arguments of that speech. Those who wish could familiarize themselves with those arguments in my recently published book Return. It is a fact that the Armenian National Congress is the only political organization that has been clearly and consistently demanding Serge Sargsyan's resignation, as well as the conduct of new presidential and parliamentary elections. Nobody else has so far put forward such a demand. That could somehow be treated with understanding while the change of power was only about the restoration of the constitutional order, which was an internal matter, and which others could disagree with, but it is difficult to accept it when the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh obviously depends on it.

Thus, all we can do is conclude that they are interested neither in Karabakh nor in democracy. And it is not only the political parties in the ruling coalition that do not care, but also the pocket political organizations, which benefit from the current political system, the criminal oligarchic economic elite, the court intelligentsia, which has turned patriotism into a profession; the leadership of the Armenian Academy of Sciences and the directors of research institutes, the presidents of all state institutes of higher educations, as well as numerous journalists and political scientists. I do not want to name names. You know them all. Where are these people? Why are they silent? Why are they not sounding the alarm? If they are really concerned about Karabakh's future, what prevents them from coming to the streets at least once, putting up tents, organizing round-the-clock rallies and marches, standing on the path of the bullets of the glorious Armenian army and the troops brought in from Karabakh? Do they think that others should suffer and sacrifice while they are here only to fake patriotism and to enjoy themselves?

The Armenian National Congress does not need to prove that for the sake of realizing the aspirations of our people it is prepared for any sacrifice and hardship. But unfortunately until the aforementioned forces do not rise up and call Serge Sargsyan to account for his destructive Karabakh policy, the Armenian National Congress will not be able to thwart the danger hanging over Karabakh alone even if it maximally exerts itself. This bitter truth seems suspicious to certain people, and they sometimes accuse the Congress that by avoiding drastic steps it is waiting for Serge Sargsyan to fail so that afterwards it can come to power in Armenia riding the wave of popular protest. Leaving aside the question as to why under those circumstances the critics of the Congress are not mobilizing the people themselves, I want to do away with those suspicions once and for all and state the following:

a. the Armenian National Congress does not need political power at the cost of losing Karabakh;

b. If Sargsyan resigns the presidency I will not put my candidature up with the exception of the circumstance where Robert Kocharyan is also a candidate.

c. I have always considered myself an instrument for restoring the constitutional order in the country and I am prepared to carry out that work to the end.

Looking forward to the activization of the other political forces and yielding the arena to them, the Congress today is not going to announce a date for its next meeting, which will be done on a later date. Depending on the reactions of those forces we will decide on what to do afterwards. I generally don't like to personify problems, but when names are not named, everybody pretends that it is not about him or her. Therefore, if there are no reactions, I will probably have to name some names during our next rally. I consider it necessary also to add that the decision not to reveal the date of the next rally is the result of another important circumstance. To the surprise of our entire society, after having rejected over a 100 petitions by the Congress for rallies, the authorities have all of a sudden decided to grant a permission to conduct six consecutive rallies. What can this mean? Probably two things. Either the authorities are trying to show that the restrictions in Armenia on conducting rallies and marches have been removed prior to the upcoming meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or, and this is more likely, Serge Sargsyan has decided to involve the Congress in some disgusting game, which we naturally cannot allow.

And now let us march and till next time.

18 September 2009