Dear comrades and guests,
It is obvious that the Congress of the ANM is taking place amidst a supersensitive situation in Armenia both internally and externally and in a situation characterized by serious challenges facing the country. I am not going to provide a detailed analysis of the situation, nor am I going to evaluate the actions of the authorities or those of the opposition stemming from it, and I certainly do not want to criticize or accuse anybody. All possible criticisms and mutual accusations have been aired many times over, and it is hardly possible to add something new to them. As far as the analyses and assessments are concerned, they are available in abundance as well. The question is whether that abundance helps shed light on the vital problems of the state.
Not denying the usefulness of analyses and assessments, from the perspective of practical politics it is more important to calmly uncover and identify those basic realities, which any judicious political force must take into account, be it a force in power or in opposition. Ignoring those realities and allowing oneself to be guided by wishful thinking is equivalent to criminal naiveté or political derangement. If a policy is not based on realities, it can be called anything, but policy.
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What are then the basic realities dictating the political behavior of Armenia?
First: Without resolution of the Karabakh conflict and normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, Armenia has no prospect of improving its security, economic performance, and demographic picture, regardless of who is in power in Armenia. The failure to appreciate this simple truth has already caused irreversible losses, the most dangerous among them being the substantial decline in the population numbers both in Armenia and Karabakh, which is going to have disastrous consequences if something is not done as quickly as possible. The "Armenia will be able to develop under the conditions of the blockade for another one hundred years" idea can be considered logical only in one sense, that is "in a hundred years Armenia may be a developed area, but without Armenians." It is unfortunate that this was not a random thought, but rather the political credo of the Kocharyan administration. Demography is thus the key problem, which from the 11th century on has been the source of all the misfortunes that have befallen the Armenian people. Refusing to take this into account and blindly pursuing the goal of preserving the status quo means exacerbating the demographic crisis and accelerating the national disaster. Not to take into consideration this fact and to seek to keep the status quo blindly means to deepen the demographic crisis and to hasten the national disaster. The day is not far, when we ourselves will fulfill the dream of Tsars and Turks, and will have an Armenia without Armenians. No proof is needed, for it is difficult to imagine a more eloquent proof than the steep decline of the population both in Armenia and Karabakh in recent years. The weakest point in the arguments of the proponents of preserving the status quo is the absence of an answer to the question how they intend to stop the continuing exodus.
Second. So far as the Karabakh conflict is not settled, we cannot rule out the danger that the war will reignite. The statement "the alternative to compromise is war" is still valid and will remain so, no matter how long it takes to be convinced of that. Leaving aside the belligerent statements and mutual boasting, the authorities of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are fortunately still aware of this threat and are trying to explore all the remaining diplomatic opportunities to settle the problem. But this state of affairs cannot be sustained forever. The situation may get out of control and lead to new bloodshed if diplomacy fails or the negotiating process is dragged on indefinitely. If not Armenia, at least Azerbaijan certainly has the option of a military solution to the conflict in its calculations. The following arguments are invoked against this assertion: Azerbaijan is not capable of bringing Armenia and Karabakh to their knees by the force of arms; the opponent will suffer a devastating defeat thanks to the fighting ability and the high morale of the Armenian Army; the world will not allow the resumption of military operations; and finally, the OTCS (Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security) will strike an adequate counterblow if Azerbaijan unleashes a war. I leave it to you to judge the extent to which these arguments are serious. If necessary I am ready to examine their validity one by one. Now I will limit myself to pointing out that the danger of the resumption of hostilities is as real today as it was yesterday and as it will be tomorrow. We must not deceive ourselves, and we certainly should not deceive our people. The people should know the price they will have to pay for the policies of their authorities.
Third. I think nobody doubts any longer that the Armenian-Turkish relations will not be normalized unless the negotiations to settle the Karabakh conflict are completed or unless considerable progress is made in them. How many times should the leaders of Turkey repeat this for everybody to finally understand this reality? The statements that the Armenian-Turkish relations and the Karabakh problem are not related, which were not serious from the beginning, have today been discredited completely. To the contrary, such statements have only confirmed the connectedness of these problems, otherwise there would not have been any need to repeat it over and over again. Why does nobody ever claim that the Armenian-Turkish relations are not related to the Armenian-Chinese, Armenian-Japanese, or Armenian-Argentinean relations?
This nonsense, therefore, should be expunged from the phraseology of international diplomacy in order not to distort the essence of the issue. Thus, if the Armenian authorities are genuinely interested in a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, which they themselves have initiated, they should first find a solution to the Karabakh conflict. Whatever other statements they make about the Armenian-Turkish relations, are idle talk and expressions of wounded pride. Whether Turkey managed to impose this situation on Armenia through cunning is an entirely different matter, but the fact that this has become the reality cannot be ignored any longer.
Fourth. I have always been of the opinion that contrary to the seemingly active engagement of the Minsk Group, the problem has lingered not so much because of the disagreement between the parties to the conflict, but because it has not been a high priority problem for the West, which has prevented the latter from making an adequate effort in that direction. The efforts of the West have been directed and are directed to dealing with other priorities - international terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the economic crisis, etc. Following the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 it seemed that the Karabakh conflict was becoming a priority for the West - a misperception, which, I confess, I have succumbed to as well, albeit with reservations. Now, however, it is obvious for me that Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and the economic crisis make up such a heavy burden for the West, that there is no time for it to think about Karabakh and about the South Caucasus in general. Even the Caucasian corridor for transporting the energy resources into the world economy does not have the relative weight, which would force the West to make extreme efforts. Therefore, if the problem of Karabakh is not a priority for the West, it should have the decency to confess this reality in order to make alternatives available for the parties to the conflict. In 1920 Great Britain was honest enough to advise the leaders of Armenia not to rely on the West and to try to settle their problems through compromises with the countries of the region. The value of this advice is not diminished at all by the fact that the Armenians were shortsighted enough not to follow it.
Fifth. Unlike it is for the West, the South Caucasus has been and remains an area of vital interests for Russia, and it is naive to think that it will ever foreswear the policy of defending those interests. The aforementioned passivity of the West is also partially explained by the fact that even if subconsciously, it views this area as a zone of Russia's influence. If not the USA, then at least most of the countries of the European Union have reconciled themselves to this idea and obviously have no intention of actively engaging in the affairs of the South Caucasus. It means that the key to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, as well as the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations is in Russia's hands. Therefore, irrespective of its preferences, any government of Armenia should look for the solution of these vital problems in this geopolitical context. Such behavior has to do neither with wishes nor with political orientations, but merely with the appreciation of the reality on the ground and the imperatives of political realism. My impression is that the authorities of Armenia do not have that appreciation yet. Turkey and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, clearly evaluate the reality more accurately, which is evidenced by the active contacts of these countries with Russia. We, as a result, have found ourselves in the situation we were in 1920 from which we did not find the correct way out at the time. Today we have no right to repeat the same mistake.
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And now a few words about the internal problems of the Armenian National Movement, which are actively being discussed in the press and in political circles. But these discussions are not more than rumors and do not reflect the reality at all. Meanwhile, the reality is that in recent times the Armenian authorities have tried to exercise influence inside the ANM and create a breach between the party and the Armenian National Congress. Thanks to the watchfulness of most members of the ANM board and the council, the attempted sabotage has been uncovered in a timely fashion, and the potential rift in the ranks of the Congress has been completely neutralized. Therefore, I have no doubt that the ANM will come out of this experience more driven, more united, and stronger, directing all of its efforts and abilities toward the realization of the goals and programs of the Armenian National Congress. Both the healthy and exciting atmosphere in this hall and the unambiguous and content-rich resolution leave no hope that anybody can drive a wedge between the ANM and the Congress. It is time for the Armenian authorities, as well as the external actors to realize that the Armenian National Congress is a permanent factor in the political life of the republic with an indispensable role, which is unlikely to deteriorate or be removed by any means. We have withstood shootings, prisons, police and taxation terror, and will also withstand such dirty little tricks. After this congress we will surely be able to declare that the cooperation between the ANM and the Armenian National Congress is unshakeable. Hence long live the Armenian National Movement, long live the Armenian National Congress, long live all member parties of the Congress, organizations, tens of thousands of individuals, and may success be the result of our common struggle.
20 July 2010
On 1 March of this year we together adopted a situational program of demands and actions, consisting of 15 items. During the rally on 17 March, we isolated the three urgent items of the first phase - the release of political prisoners, the removal of the illegal ban on rallies at the Freedom Square, and the official assurance of the willingness to investigate the killings of 1 March, 2008 - the implementation of which is necessary for starting a formal dialogue with the authorities aimed at resolving of the other problems put forward by the society. We also agreed that we are not going to rush, that we are going to act within the confines of the constitution and the law, that we are going to achieve the realization of our demands one step at a time, in a smooth manner and without subjecting the country to social uprisings and political upheaval, not because we dispute the legitimacy of revolutionary methods, but exclusively out of concern that doing those things would increase the probability of Azerbaijan unleashing a war. If some people are skeptical about this, I have no doubt that Azerbaijan will resume hostilities in case of a serious instability in Armenia.
I promised at the last rally that my speech today would be dedicated primarily to one of the most dangerous and disgraceful problems that plagues Armenia - the incredible depth of the corruption. But before I get on to the core subject, I would like to deal with one absurdity, which is being fed to our people day and night for more than a year already. We are accused of focusing on the foreign policy issues at the expense of the problems of domestic politics, and what is more, statements have been made that the authorities have succeeded in imposing their agenda on the opposition, diverting the latter from the goals of effecting change in the country's domestic life. These nicely formulated and at first convincing-sounding statements, however, have nothing to do either with reality or with the elementary tenets of the study of politics. Putting aside the trivial cliché about international politics being the extension of domestic politics, we should just point out that the separation of domestic and international politics is simply done for reasons of methodological convenience. Any state's foreign and domestic policies form a united whole, and they inform the agendas of both the government and the opposition as such. Domestic politics depends on foreign policy as much as foreign policy depends on domestic politics. No thinking person could raise or has raised objections against the claim that the continued foreign policy failures of the Armenian government are the definite result of the unhealthy internal atmosphere in the country, and in particular the corrupt and illegitimate nature of the authorities. It is equally obvious that many of the negative aspects of the country's domestic life are the consequence of external circumstances. Is it not clear that we would not have political prisoners, fraudulent elections, limitations on democracy, blatant violations of human rights, or corruption that is so widespread, had it not been for the tolerant attitude of the outside world, and had the great powers not regarded all these things as convenient tools in the service of their geopolitical goals? So the activities of the Armenian National Congress are anchored in the realization of the organic interconnectedness of the external and internal problems, and let nobody search for a black cat in a dark room, because there is no cat.
Although I do not have the habit of commenting on thoughts I have expressed previously, I have to make some additional clarifications regarding the claims made in my speech at the ANM congress (07.17.2010), because it has become subject to certain controversies, misunderstandings, and distortions.
In my pervious speech (18.09.2009) I had promised to discuss the Armenian-Turkish protocols in more detail on some other occasion. I think the current situation, which has been clarified as a result of their signing is the most convenient opportunity for fulfilling that promise. I will try to refrain from making emotional assessments and analyze what has happened, as well as its consequences exclusively from the political perspective. I only have to warn that despite the expectations of the media my speech is going to be not programmatic but explanatory, although I do not deny the need for a programmatic speech as well.
